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The Arctic region has spectacular roots in Indian civilizational thinking and thus represents 
a familiar region. Shaped by its long association and significant expertise in the Antarctic 
Treaty System; its first scientific expedition to the Arctic Ocean in 2007  followed by the 
setting of the Arctic research base in 2008 and subsequently its Permanent Observer status 
in 2013, India’s dominant narrative remains scientific and polar research. But with summer 
in the Arctic arriving early and staying longer, accessibility to the vast natural resources and 
huge investment has significantly altered the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic region. The 
question of how to develop the resources in a sustainable and peaceful manner competes with 
the complex science of the Arctic and the unique risks that such commercial ventures pose. 
India’s reluctance to de-emphasize its scientific interest towards a more calibrated approach 
that takes into account the politico-strategic-economic dimensions in the Arctic reflects the 
tension between the exceptionalism and the realism of its polar legacy. The article assesses 
how the Arctic orientation is changing from a uni-dimensional to a dynamic and multi-
dimensional engagement. The author argues that India’s Arctic approach is essentially binary: 
while indeed India has a stake in the governance of global commons and to cooperate with the 
littoral states for effective science policies, it also cares about sustainable resource development 
without making the Arctic region unstable.
Keywords: India, Arctic Council, civilizational, climate change, energy. 
Introduction
Regions are fundamentally geographical concept but become dynamic and change-
able with the influence of political factors. The Arctic is no exception. Growing access 
to resources and the geopolitical dynamics are impacting the Arctic landscape as never 
before. As a region of high-risk climate vulnerability and high-reward economic develop-
ment, the Arctic has emerged as a critical arena in the 21st century geopolitics, scientific 
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research and commerce. The future pattern of climate change and ice-melting will un-
doubtedly open areas for cooperation but also potentially competition and contestation. 
Consequently, countries’ interests are bound to intersect on issues in the Arctic whether 
related to sovereignty or international law, or on governance. On the other hand, with in-
creasing scientific findings, the public today is far more aware about the polar region and 
polar climate change, reflecting, in a way, a changed conversation on the fragility of the 
Arctic than the images of a desolate, dreary and dark Arctic.
A number of conceptual and contextual challenges emerge in the contemporary Arc-
tic, such as, the possibility of Arctic to continue to play an exemplary role in the treatment 
of competitive-cooperative relations in the international system; in handling the human-
environment relations in the Anthropocene1 and whether the largely cooperative relations 
among the Arctic 8  (Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, 
Russia and the USA) will witness strains by the growing pressure on the part of powerful 
non-Arctic states to be granted a stronger voice in Arctic affairs.
With India and China along with Japan, South Korea and Singapore being accepted 
as Permanent Observer to the Arctic Council (hereon Council) at the Kiruna Ministerial 
Meeting in May 2013, Asian countries involvement in the Arctic region has increased 
steadily. The observer definition clearly, without being subordinate, emphasises on the 
non-Arctic states to ‘accept’, ‘support’, ‘recognize’, ‘respect’ and ‘demonstrate’ various ob-
jectives of the Council. A variety of interlinked issues from shipping routes and resource 
exploitation to resource governance and climate impact have raised questions on the scope 
of the Council, its organisational structure, establishing priorities, and funding. As the 
Asian observers participate in the Council, these questions will very much be observed by 
them [2, p. 8; 3, p. 392; 4, p. 89–90].
The Arctic 8 view the participation of the Asian states as a promising economic pos-
sibility while not discounting the security and governance challenges. The Council, the 
pre-eminent regional forum, with its permanent members and an expanded observer 
members, has long focused on environmental cooperation and assessment although its 
activities and has over the past few years developed guidelines for economic activities 
as well. It is this growing range of activities under the guidance of the Council alongside 
the more articulated Arctic interests of the Arctic states that have opened space for non-
Arctic, Asian states participation and stakes northwards. 
With the above background, this article positions itself amongst existing works that 
speculate on the motivations and outcomes of India’s approach in the Arctic. Clearly the 
participation of new observers is changing the dynamics of interactions within the Coun-
cil. The interplay and interpretation between the older observer and permanent members 
of the Council vis-a-vis Asian interests are interesting to observe. Understanding these 
transformations in the Council will be pertinent given the organization’s significant role 
in the policy deliberations and governance of a region that has been caught up with sci-
entific and climate change discourses and debates about wider economic imperatives and 
opportunities (e. g. natural resource extractions and the opening up of lucrative Arctic sea 
routes). 
Unlike in the scientific fields of climatology, glaciology and oceanography, India has 
yet to develop a comprehensive Arctic political and economic approach. However, the is-
1 The concept given by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer in 2000. They suggested the age be called 
the Anthropocene or the ‘recent age of man’ [1, p. 17].
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sues of Arctic development are now being widely discussed beyond the scientific, thereby 
encouraging a broad-based Arctic programme. The article will examine India’s civiliza-
tional connect in the Arctic, the enduring polar scientific engagement and the more recent 
diplomatic and political engagement vis-à-vis the Arctic littoral states, with emphasis on 
Russia. 
India and the Arctic: Civilizational and Contemporary
In recent times, India has been closely following the developments in the Arctic re-
gion. Its Arctic approach is a product of the intertwining global forces of the environment, 
commercial and the strategic. In 2007 India took a scientific expedition to the Arctic Ocean 
and in 2008 it opened a scientific research station Himadri at the international research 
base in Ny-Alesund in Svalbard. With its growing scientific participation and financial 
investments in Arctic studies, India was elected to the Council of the International Arctic 
Science Committee in 2012. Determined to expand its footprint, India applied for Ob-
server Status in 2012 and the following year it was granted Observer Status to the Council. 
These contemporary developments in the Arctic cannot be viewed in isolation and need to 
be seen through the lens of diverse perspectives. India’s prevailing narrative in the Arctic 
is a scientific endeavour, other narratives such as the economic and strategic are gaining 
attention. However, India’s policy choices in the Arctic should not be polarised between 
the idealism of scientific and the realism of economic and strategic issues but a rational 
choice of carefully studying and assessing the region before drawing policy conclusions. 
The contemporariness of India’s relationship with the Arctic is unmistakable but 
there also exists racial, philosophical, anthropological and linguistic dimensions, which 
remains much unexplored. For India, the Arctic has a civilizational connect and a racial 
memory. While India’s colonial participation (the British Empire) as party to the Spitsber-
gen Treaty (1920) that defined Norway’s sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago of Sval-
bard is well understood, the debate on various theories of Indian ancestry has remained 
underexplored in India’s popular and contemporary discourses on the Arctic. It was Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak, leader of India’s independence movement, who through his work The 
Arctic Home in the Vedas (1903) concluded that the ancestors of India’s ancient Vedic civi-
lisation lived in the Arctic region. It was for the first time that Arctic featured in India’s ra-
cial debate. This, of course, was challenged later by the ‘Out-of-India’ theory that claimed 
the Indo-European languages originated in India and moved westwards thus debunking 
the Aryan migration theory. The point, however, is not to contest or support Tilak’s find-
ings, but to locate Arctic in the popular imagination of India’s racial profiling. There is a 
historical legacy that needs to be underscored in India’s contemporary Arctic policies by 
looking at Tilak’s arguments.
Tilak’s interpretation of cultural-historical geography came at a time when geo-
graphical determinism emerged as a dominant school of thought around the end of the 
19th century and the beginning of 20th century, which viewed human history being de-
termined by the physical environment. Political geographers of the time like Friedrich 
Ratzel and Harlford Mackinder, imperialist in their outlook, emphasised location and to-
pography as important geographic properties in influencing geopolitical thinking. Ratzel 
compared the state to an organism which needed space (lebensraum) to expand [5, p. 60–
62], whereas Mackinder strongly felt that geography should have objectives that serve the 
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needs of the state [6, p. 425]. While Ratzel and Mackinder’s work offer a conceptual peg to 
the dramatically changing landscape and seascape in the Arctic in contemporary times, 
which is keeping both the littoral and non-littoral countries interested through competi-
tion and cooperation as well as strategic positioning and posturing, Tilak brought in an 
Indian consciousness to human social evolution as a response to physical environment. 
Tilak’s research remains the most striking interpretation of Indo-Aryan history and 
through his valuable works, Orion or the Antiquity of the Vedas (1892)  and The Arctic 
Home of Vedas (1903) refuted the argument that the European culture developed earlier 
than the Indian culture and used the Vedic texts to assert the superiority of the Indo-
Aryan culture. 
Unlike the European experience where a collective idea of the pole came through the 
detailed notes and diaries of the explorers and inspired many polar prose and verses, in 
India, the Vedas (the oldest scriptures of Hinduism written in Sanskrit) were the fountain 
head of knowledge of the Arctic. Interpreting the text of the Vedas was an evidenced based 
exercise to fill the missing gaps in the origin and migration theory of the Aryans. 
Contemporary developments in the Arctic cannot be viewed in isolation and need 
to be seen through the lens of diverse perspectives. By revealing, in this section, the in-
tertwining forces of geography and culture, an attempt has been made to contextualise 
and intellectualise India’s Arctic attention as a familiar territory and not an alien region 
thereby helping to position it in the policy domain which remains crowded with other 
immediate issues. 
India’s polar evolution
Post-independence, polar research in India developed as an offshoot of its ocean 
views and thinking [7, p. 110]. For India, the sea and its coastline have always been vital as 
the Indian summer monsoon rainfall is influenced by a system of oscillating sea surface 
temperatures. The sea has a great influence on the physical and meteorological conditions 
and realizing the significance of its vast sea coast, India set up the Department of Ocean 
Development (DOD) in 1981 with an aim of creating a “deeper understanding of the oce-
anic regime, the development of technology and technological aids for harnessing of re-
sources and understanding of various physical, chemical and biological processes”  [8]. 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi showed particular interest in scientific and technology 
endeavours and considered it critical to India’s development, global standing and knowl-
edge contribution. Advancement in nuclear and atomic research, space development and 
subsequently polar research got the necessary political boost and sustained capital flow.
The DOD was established as a focal point to promote institutional capability in the 
ocean areas, where India had little knowledge and scant experience. Also it was reasoned 
that the complexity of the ocean science would require a broad-based interdisciplinary 
approach. The DOD thus became the central agency to help comprehensive ocean devel-
opment programmes and put India in the forefront of nation with domain expertise. The 
DOD was given sufficient powers and financial autonomy to coordinate efforts with other 
agencies and was also given the responsibilities to closely cooperate with both develop-
ing and developed countries in a “spirit of understanding of the concept that the oceans 
are a common heritage of humankind” [8]. One of the programmes of the DOD was the 
‘Antarctic expedition and Polar science’. The DOD was the nodal centre to monitor and 
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study the Antarctic and by 1983 India had set up a permanent research station (Dakshin 
Gangotri). The Antarctic has been the laboratory of India’s polar research, gradually giving 
it the capability and capacity to engage subsequently in the Arctic.
The DOD transformed into a full-fledged Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) in 2006. 
The purpose was to create a framework for understanding and unravelling the complex 
interaction among key elements of the Earth system — ocean and atmosphere. The minis-
try is an umbrella of all the meteorological and ocean development activities of India and 
is headed by a senior cabinet minister. It is responsible for formulating and implementing 
policies as well as ensuring necessary interdisciplinary integration. “It is mandated to pro-
vide the nation with best possible services in forecasting the monsoons and other weather/
climate parameters, ocean state, earthquakes, tsunamis and other phenomena related to 
earth systems through well integrated programmes” [8]. The MoES in its charter also deals 
with science and technology for exploration and exploitation of ocean resources and is the 
nodal point for Antarctic /Arctic and Southern Ocean research. 
The scientific activities of India in polar research which began in a small but earnest 
way in Antarctic have evolved and expanded to the northern Arctic. The north and south 
polar research is now a deep, comprehensive and ongoing programme subject to continu-
ous review and updating in accordance with the national priorities and global perspec-
tives. While India’s Antarctic scientific reach is now well established and deeply imprinted, 
its Arctic endeavours are relatively recent. Amongst the Asian countries — China, Japan 
and South Korea — India is the last to have set up a research station in the Arctic region. 
The Arctic has further widened India’s research from pole to pole. With research stations 
at both poles, India has a formidable advantage in data collection and comparison. Being a 
developing country with a high level of vulnerability to the impact of climate change, India 
is committed to understanding the scientific processes behind climate change, moreover, 
India’s management of the Himalaya requires a comprehensive study of glaciology. The 
geopolitical rhetoric of Arctic ‘exceptionalism’, according to Sanjay Chaturvedi “appears 
rather untenable in the face of transformational multiscalar change, growing number of 
stakeholders, uncertainty and risks” [9, p. 41].
India has reasons to worry about the geo-physical changes in the Arctic. First and 
foremost, a number of studies have indicated that there are connections between the Arc-
tic region and the strength of Indian monsoon [10, p. 356–357]. Tele-connection between 
tropical Indian Ocean and the Arctic for better understanding the monsoon dynamics is 
critical for India’s agricultural sector. Indian researchers have detected this relation but 
need further findings and investigation on intra-seasonal, inter-annual and decadal time 
scales.
Second, the acceleration of sea level rise as a consequence of the melting of the gla-
ciers in Antarctica and the Greenland ice, based on the study of 25-years of NASA and 
European satellite data, may cause sea level rise by 65 cm in 2100 resulting in significant 
problems for coastal cities [11]. India has a coastline of 7516 sq km with about 20 per 
cent of the population living in the coastal areas and a larger percentage of this residing 
in coastal cities like Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. The above risks have resulted in rapid 
intensification of Indian scientific research in the Antarctica and Arctic. 
With its experience in the Antarctic, India established, in 2008, a research station in 
Ny-Alesund, one of the four permanent settlements in the island of Spitzbergen, in the 
Svalbard archipelago. ‘Christened’ as Himadri (Greater Himalaya as the abode of snow), 
118 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 1
it primarily conducts research on atmospheric sciences, earth sciences/palaeo-climate, 
glaciology/geology and biological studies [12]. The christening of research stations in 
Antarctic and Arctic draws attention to the Hindu ancient texts and the significance of 
the Himalayas. For example, Dakshin Gangotri, India’s first research base in the Antarc-
tic, now decommissioned, expresses the significance of Gangotri, a glacier source of the 
Ganga, which is the most revered river in India. Maitri, the second research station in 
Antarctica, is a Sanskrit word meaning friendship and is also the name of an important 
Hindu ancient text Maitrayaniya Upanishad. 
India: Tri-polar nation
By connecting the two poles to the Himalaya landscape through scientific linkages 
and ancient Hindu symbols, the idea of India as a ‘tri-polar nation’ easily resonates with 
public imagination by bringing in a cosmic frame of reference. In Hindu belief, the natural 
habitat of spirits and gods are the mountaintops. Myth has it that Mount Meru, the abode 
of gods, with its foothills, the Himalaya, stands in the centre of the earth and is the axis 
of the world. Neeraj Kumar in his work on the ancient geophilosophy of India or the Sri-
yantra writes, “Essentially the geographical positioning of a country influences its think-
ing and thus impacts its philosophy. Sri-yantra, a mythical instrument, strikes a balance 
between the gross subtle and causal dimensions of the microcosmic and macrocosmic 
phenomena. It syncs with the esoteric ontology of the cosmos, the individual body, the 
state, the nation in its geographic aspect, all creative and conducive societal values, and 
the grand unification of existing dogmas, doctrines, creeds and commitments” [13, p. 19].
The scale of the research activities in the Arctic has been modest as large portions 
of the financial resources given to the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research 
now called the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR) is utilized for 
maintaining the two research stations in Antarctic2. Since 2007, India has sent expeditions 
twice a year to the Arctic and has so far spent USD 3 million on research activities and 
till May 2013 there were only four scientists working at the Himadri research station. But 
now as an observer status and with increased budget (USD 12 million by 2018) greater 
attention is expected3. Some of India’s major research objectives in the Arctic region are 
geared towards analysing ‘hypothesized tele-connections’ between the Arctic climate and 
the Indian monsoon; studying the characteristic changes in the sea ice in the Arctic due to 
warming; and investigating Arctic glaciers and effect on sea-level rise [16]. Similar studies 
on the counteracting effect of future sea-ice loss on the Indian monsoon are being carried 
out in the Antarctic [17]. 
One of the prime objectives to study the glaciers in the Arctic is to compare and 
observe the rate of changes in the Himalayan glaciers, and then to understand its impact 
on the hydrology, ecology and climate. Using ice as an archive of information, Indian 
scientists are drawing data from the Arctic to monitor the biogeochemical aspects of the 
Himalayan ice. 
The glaciers of the Himalaya provide the source for the major Asian rivers including 
the Mekong and the Brahmaputra. Growing evidences indicating changing profile of the 
2 The Ministry of Earth Sciences response to questions in Parliament [14]. 
3 In 2013, the government planned to increase the budget to USD 12 million in the next 5 years (2013–
2018). The statement of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India [15].
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glaciers, reduced permafrost, and monsoon variability are a source of livelihood concern 
for the vast population that is dependent on water for agricultural activities. 
Balancing scientific with commercial: Russian factor
With the opening of the regular Moscow-Spitzbergen North Pole route for extreme 
tourism enthusiast in 2002, Russia brought back its attention to the Arctic. Russia has 
much to gain from the Arctic region in terms of resource development and the North Sea 
route passage. Despite the off and on assertive rhetoric on the Arctic, it largely has a coop-
erative framework with the Arctic 8. While Russia continues to have a military presence 
in the Arctic to protect its strategic assets and infrastructure albeit significantly reduced 
since the Cold War era it is unlikely to militarise the Arctic. Russia is wary of NATO and 
in recent times it has not flinched in showing hostility. It will be interesting to observe the 
role of the Council in limiting the potential for unintended escalation of tensions within 
the Arctic 8. Maybe the time has come for the Council to bring into discussion security 
issues, which has never been its mandate. 
Russia is referred to as “India’s ticket to the Arctic energy riches” [18]. Two specific 
areas emerge for India’s engagement — the scientific and resource exploitation. From an 
environmental / scientific consideration, India’s engagements in the Arctic is a measure of 
its climate concerns and a reassurance to the global community about its climate commit-
ment thereby banishing the western thoughts that India is not doing enough in the battle 
against global warming. On the resource front, particularly oil and gas, there has been 
much excitement over the hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic but strong questions remain 
over its extraction, affordability and environmental damages. Given India’s standing on 
the global climate change issues, it will be seen as being hypocritical if any advancement is 
made towards new oil exploration. Gas development, on the other hand, a lesser polluter 
than oil, is a possibility because it is less CO2 intensive. 
Recently, India’s engagement with Russia has looked beyond the two pillars of de-
fence and energy suggesting that the bilateral relations are becoming far more dynamic. 
Cooperation in areas such as hi-tech, people to people contacts and scientific ties has 
gained momentum. Resultantly, a strong thrust on the Arctic has emerged with India in-
creasing its investments into promising projects and simultaneously developing its climate 
research. For Russia, India’s participation in the development of natural resources of the 
Russian Arctic, is beneficial amidst Western sanctions. “Cooperation with India will also 
allow Russia to considerably enhance its export capacities, extending the geography of its 
supplies, diversifying its sales markets, and partially compensating its losses due to exter-
nal limitations. Indian partners lack critical expertise in the development of shelf deposits 
under severe climate conditions, but the Russian oil industry urgently needs an additional 
source of investments” [19, p. 15]. 
The joint statements of 2014  emphasised on joint exploration of hydrocarbons by 
Russian and Indian companies in the Arctic region and were expanded to include “sci-
entific cooperation to study challenges like melting ice, climate change, marine life and 
bio-diversity” [20]. The two countries since 2016 have shown interest in expanding their 
cooperation in Arctic energy and scientific development.
The joint statement of 2015 stated, “Both Sides acknowledge the significance of sup-
ply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies from Russia to India. In this regard, the Sides 
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expressed satisfaction at the development of cooperation between Gazprom Group and its 
Indian partners in LNG trade. The Russian Side welcomes the interest and involvement of 
Indian partners with regard to cooperation in joint projects stipulating the possibility of 
LNG supply to India from JSC NOVATEK project Arctic LNG on the resource base of the 
fields located on the Gydan Peninsula and partly in the Gulf of Ob” [21]. Further the joint 
statement said, “Considering Russia’s status as a member of the Arctic Council (AC) and 
India’s observer status at this organization since 2013, the Sides emphasized the impor-
tance of joint activities in the framework of the Arctic Council. They acknowledged the 
potential for the development of joint scientific research in the Arctic region, particularly 
the Russian Scientific Center on Spitsbergen (Svalbard) archipelago” [21].
In October 2016, a consortium of Indian companies, headed by Oil India Limited 
(OIL) formalised a 23.9 per cent acquisition of Vankorneft (a Rosneft controlled company 
managing the huge Vankor oilfield). This was followed by OIL taking another 29.9 per 
cent stake in the nearby Tass-Yuryakh oilfield. By the end of October 2016, ONGC Videsh 
completed the acquisition of an additional 11 per cent interest in Vankor oilfield taking 
its stake to 26  per cent. Both the two projects are located in Russia’s northern Tundra 
to the west of river Yenisey [22]. Earlier in 2013, the consortium comprising of OVL-
Petronet LNG and IOC started talks with Russian OAO Novatek for a stake in the com-
pany’s Phase I Yamal project mainly to gain access to some 16.5 million tonnes of LNG/
year from 2016 [22]. However, OVL did not find the offer attractive and backed-off. Russia 
has once again offered Indian oil companies a stake in the Phase II of the Yamal project, 
the biggest project to produce LNG from the Arctic [23].
The Vankor oilfield is an example of an Indian company cooperating with Russia’s 
Rosneft and building business confidence by investing in Russia. In March 2017 Gazprom 
Neft and ONGC Videsh signed a MoU for offshore hydrocarbon production projects in 
Russia [24]. These deals are important, particularly as the NSR (Northern Sea Route) 
opens up to shipping and trade. The ONGC Videsh which is already taking part in the 
flagship Sakhlin I project in Far East Russia has commenced production from the Akutun 
Dagi, the third and final oil and gas field [25] will benefit from the NSR by supplying oil 
and gas to Europe in the west and Japan in the east. These successes have opened up new 
opportunities to investment in Russia’s Far East. At the 3rd Eastern Economic Forum in 
2017 in Vladivostok, five country-level business dialogues took place at the Forum that 
included Russia — India with the theme ‘Identifying New Opportunities’ [26]. India is 
eager to participate in the regions development in the east as well as in the Barents and 
Murmansk region in the west. 
The St Petersburg Declaration 2017 refers to building an “Energy Bridge” between the 
two countries, stating, “We are interested in launching joint projects on exploration and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic shelf of the Russian Federation” [28]. In the 
recent joint statement of 2018, a broader road map on the Arctic was envisioned. It states, 
“The two Sides expressed interest in the development of mutually beneficial cooperation 
in the Arctic, inter alia in the sphere of joint scientific research.” The Sides noted with 
satisfaction the longstanding cooperation of Indian and Russian scientists in the Antarctic 
and expressed “…to work together to explore joint projects for productive, efficient and 
economic use of natural resources in each other’s country through application of appro-
priate technologies while ensuring affordable environment friendly utilization of natural 
resources”. On the energy front, the joint statement noted, “the importance of further 
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widening of energy cooperation between India and Russia taking into account the Indian 
Side’s interest in Russian energy assets, including natural gas, as well as in implementation 
of prospective joint projects in the field of renewable energy sources” and expressed “their 
support to companies from both sides for development of cooperation and exploring op-
portunities for joint development of oil fields in the Russian territory, including in the 
Arctic shelf of Russia and joint development of projects on the shelf of the Pechora and 
Okhotsk Seas” [29].
India imports more than 80 per cent of its oil needs or closely 2.6 million barrels per 
day from the West Asian region including Arab Gulf. While these energy supplies have 
remained assured even in times of political instability and in return, India remains one 
of the most reliable consumers of their energy supply, it is rational to diversify the energy 
supplies thus Russia becomes a reliable energy partner. That said, India’s recent economic 
growth policies have been driven by the need to balance ecological concern with energy 
needs. India’s renewable power capacity is targeted to increase fivefold from 2014 to 2022, 
making India a clean energy leader. Renewable development can form an important part 
of cooperation between India and the Arctic states. In January 2018, Iceland Geosurvey 
and the Centre of Excellence for Geothermal Energy in Gujarat signed an agreement in 
the geothermal sector. Most of India’s geothermal locations are in the Himalayas [30]. 
While ecological consideration is undeniably the mainstay of India’s Arctic policy, 
it is reasoned that India’s economic diplomacy in the Arctic should not be hydrocarbon-
centric but also look at mineral development in the Barents Sea and secure an investment 
footing with the assistance of Norway and Russia. The Barents region has some of the best 
known mineral deposits and some of the world’s best deep harbours from which to ship 
the products. The rapid sea port development in the region will require skilled manpower 
which India can provide because of its track record of supporting port infrastructure. 
In fact these elements could be a strong aspect of its bilateral relations with both Russia 
and Norway. In 2011, Indian-born British steel baron Laxmi Mittal, planned to build an 
opencast mine 300 miles inside the Arctic circle in a bid to potentially extract USD 23 bil-
lion worth of iron ore [31]. The project failed to take off, but the value of steel commodity 
driven by increasing demand from China, India and the rest of Asia will continue to make 
the Barents a prospecting destination.
The shipping routes — Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage — that are 
fast opening up in the Arctic offer exciting prospects. But this depends on the proximity 
of the country to the Arctic. Russia and Canada have the longest Arctic coastline and each 
strongly claims the sea routes as ‘internal waters’ — which means that ships need permis-
sion to pass through the waters. Shipping through the northern sea route, as compared 
to the Suez Canal route, is calculated to cut down the distance by almost 5200  km or 
2807 nautical miles between Shanghai and Hamburg and effectively a cost saving of over 
30–40 per cent [32]. Given China, Japan and Korea’s geographical proximity, the reduced 
shipping route will be of enormous advantage. On the other hand, India will have virtually 
no benefit.
Thus, India’s naval strategy should continue to be anchored in the Indian Ocean Re-
gion and to establish itself as the resident maritime power and to thwart strategies that 
polarise the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In fact the sea routes shift through the Arctic 
will not greatly diminish the traditional Europe-Asia route. With the US’ rebalancing its 
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global engagement, the focus on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ that integrates the Indian Ocean and 
the Pacific Ocean into a single region will be far more significant [33].
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) makes sense for China, Japan and Korea but is not vi-
able for India. However, concerns come up that traffic through the NSR could lead to a shift 
in the power balance in the IOR. But since India is not a transhipment hub, trade through 
the NSR will have little impact on Indian harbours. Moreover, India has no military aspira-
tions in the Arctic. Most of the Russian equipments bought by India like the aircraft carrier, 
the nuclear submarine, and surveillance aircrafts have now been ‘tropicalized’.
Beyond the Scientific
The Arctic affairs are not far and away. India’s position of viewing the Arctic as a 
“scientific enterprise” and “knowledge enhancement” in monitoring the glaciers and the 
ecosystem in the Himalaya is a reasoned one. Reflecting on the scientific temperament 
of the current government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the MoES approved 
of the acquisition of Polar Research Vessel at a total cost of USD 155 million. This will 
help India widen the thrust on Arctic research disciplines undertaken through Indian 
research station Himadri. Such a vessel can also serve as a research platform for scientists 
to undertake scientific research in the ocean realm. However, India has to rework its 
engagement to the immediate economic and infrastructure developments in the Arctic 
region especially navigation facilities and services. 
The commercial and strategic interest will require Arctic-oriented bilateral ar-
rangements. Countries like Norway and South Korea can become significant actors in 
this calculation. There is a calculation suggesting that India should leverage trade talks 
with South Korea to achieve its Arctic interest. In 2010, India and South Korea signed a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and in 2015, Prime Minister 
Modi on his visit to Seoul advanced the CEPA to include maritime transport and sharing 
of maritime technologies [34]. As the Northern Sea Route opens up, South Korea will 
emerge as the next hub for oil storage and thus India’s calculations can clearly have divi-
dends. Not surprisingly, talks to review the Indo-Korean Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
are underway. India’s relations with South Korea has the potential to give economic im-
petus in the Arctic, particularly as India’s traditional partner Russia forges strategic part-
nership with China in the Arctic. The Council in an indirect way is providing further 
impetus to these developments. 
India is one of the fastest energy consumer in the world and the Arctic presents an 
opportunity to rekindle relationship with Russia in exploring the hydrocarbon poten-
tial. India’s labour force with skills in port development and mining can help develop 
the Barents region. Norway has good relations with Russia in the Arctic evidenced from 
the 25-years old Barents Cooperation on a number of areas, including commercial de-
velopment, transport and communication, culture, environmental protection and secu-
rity. Along with Finland and Sweden, it has proven to be one of the most enduring and 
constructive multilateral cooperation in the north since the end of the Cold War. On the 
other hand, with India’s roboust relations with Norway and its deep bonds with Russia, 
an informal triumvirate (Norway — Russia — India) can become an important catalyst of 
peace and development in the Arctic. 
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Shaping an official Arctic Policy
India is not accustomed to institutionalised doctrinal approach commonly referred 
to as official/white papers. Channels of inputs into policy making from non-partisan ex-
perts remain unstructured and impromptu. Resultantly, policy decisions are strongly in-
fluenced by personalities, political elites and the bureaucracy. Till date there is no official 
document on India’s national security though there is a growing pressure to formulate 
one. In the light of this, to expect a white paper or an official document on the Arctic 
might be ambitious. The Arctic region in terms of immediate security and foreign policy 
concerns is not a priority. Despite the low attention both in the public domain and the pol-
icy circle, India does need to play an active role in the Arctic Council and craft its signals 
carefully rather than have sporadic Arctic briefings and communiqués. To this end, a sci-
ence policy towards the Arctic is conceivable with inter-ministerial coordination between 
the Ministry of Earth Sciences and the Ministry of External Affairs. This will allow India 
to leverage its strengths to enhance cross-border science and technological cooperation. 
With science as the underpinning key interrelated perspectives can be brought into the 
policy, for example seeking possible economic opportunities on the use of sea routes and 
development of natural resources, and observing the rights of the indigenous people and 
their traditional economic practices in the region. By understating the security develop-
ments in the Arctic region and by emphasising the scientific, India’s Arctic policy readily 
fits into its soft power capacity. 
India does not have the resources to venture in a big way in the Arctic but with the ob-
server status, India can think about bringing ideas into the working groups of the Council 
that can help in the larger Arctic development by bringing together resource management, 
indigenous community rights and ecological considerations. In other words, advocating 
for sustainable resource development, which the A5 states are trying to work coopera-
tively. For that India needs to structure its collaboration in terms of capacity, technology, 
monetary contribution and incentive-based management to protect the eco-system in the 
Arctic region. The outcomes of these engagements in the Arctic can also enhance India’s 
regional role in the Hindukush Himalaya and advance the idea of a Himalayan Science 
Council with the Himalayan states: Pakistan, Nepal, China, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myan-
mar and Bangladesh.
The principle partner in India’s scientific endeavour in the Arctic is Norway. It was 
among the first country to recognise India’s independence in 1947 and in 1952 Norway’s 
very first international development cooperation, a fishery project, was started in the state 
of Kerala. In fact the Arctic engagement is an important part of India’s bilateral relations 
with Norway which has seen, in the last decade, an upswing in trade, investment and 
transfer of technology in sectors such as deep off-shore, shipping, hydro-electricity, in-
formation technology and bio-technology. It is no secret that Norway solidly supported 
India’s candidature for observer status at the Kiruna Arctic Council meet in 2013 and Nor-
way continues to back India’s candidature for permanent membership in the UN Security 
Council. Borge Brende, Norway’s foreign minister, in 2014, stated that “With strong Nor-
wegian support, India made a successful bid for permanent observer status to the Arctic 
Council last year” and that “India would be an ideal partner in international efforts on 
integrated ocean management and environmental protection” [35]. Joint projects on Po-
lar research has gained ascendency between India and Norway with Indian glaciologists 
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pursuing research in the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromso and the University Cente in 
Longyearbayen in Svalbard. 
Conclusion
Contemporary Arctic expresses an “antithetical situation” [36, p. 38–39] with eco-
nomic and commercial interest on the one end and a need for mitigating climate risks 
and resource governance at the other. No challenge in the Arctic can be tackled with-
out a holistic approach that takes into consideration the dynamic relations both among 
people and ecosystems. The evident geo-physical changes accompanied by development 
opportunities have turned the Arctic into an important space with many perspectives. 
Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds describe Arctic governance arrangements as a “ba-
zaar”, “blurring the lines” between business, governance, science, and society [37, p. 142]. 
Themes of relationship between people and the environment, the development of cul-
tural landscapes and the history of representing places are interesting observations. 
Reading through some of India’s ancient texts and mainstreaming the textual con-
nection to the contemporary Arctic policies, which has been dominated by the scientific 
narrative, is a useful exercise to emphasise that the Arctic has spectacular roots in Indian 
thinking and thus a familiar region. While India’s prevailing narrative in the Arctic is 
scientific, other narratives such as the economic and the strategic are gaining attention 
both in terms of knowledge and expression. With India’s observer status in the Coun-
cil, its longstanding strategic partnership with Russia, growing bilateral relations with 
Norway and its participation in forums like the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle 
are together helping it to engage in wider Arctic conversations. Importantly, India’s Act 
East Policy with countries like Singapore, Japan and Korea gives it an added incentive to 
bring in a set of new perspectives with Asian participation in the Arctic Council. 
It can thus be concluded that India’s Arctic approach need not be seen as a binary. 
While indeed India has a stake in the governance of global commons and to partner with 
the littoral states for effective science policies to better understand the complexities fac-
ing the Arctic, it can also simultaneously think about sustainable resource development 
without making the Arctic unstable, unsafe and insecure. 
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